Exploratory study of Timing Attack on RSA cryptosystem

Francisco Bolaños Burgos; Luis García Tenesaca; Antonio Cevallos Gamboa

Francisco Bolaños Burgos Universidad de Especialidades Espíritu Santo de Guayaquil
Luis García Tenesaca Universidad de Especialidades Espíritu Santo de Guayaquil
Antonio Cevallos Gamboa Universidad de Especialidades Espíritu Santo de Guayaquil

Keywords: Side, Channel, attacks, Timing, systems, countermeasures.

Abstract

This paper makes an exploratory bibliographic analysis of the Timing Attack (TA) technique on the Side Channel Attacks (SCA) in RSA. The information assets, operation modes and countermeasures of 22 papers were analyzed. Findings show that smartcards are the most attacked information assets (32%), blinding is the most applied countermeasure (33%) and the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) or Montgomery Multiplication (MM) with CRT are the most frequent operation modes (41%). Furthermore, just one attack was executed in telecom unication systems, this opens the possibilty for future work, analyzing the same technique using the tecnologies WiMAX and the SIP VoIP protocol.

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Author Biographies

Francisco Bolaños Burgos, Universidad de Especialidades Espíritu Santo de Guayaquil

Francisco Bolaños Burgos es ingeniero en Computación y magíster en seguridad informática aplicada de la Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral (ESPOL) en Guayaquil, Ecuador. Se desempeña como director de la Maestría en Auditoría de Tecnologías de la Información (MATI). Enseña criptografía, hackeo ético y seguridad de la información en la Facultad de Postgrados en UEES. Sus líneas de investigación son: seguridad de la información y herramientas de evaluación (rubrics y scripts).

Luis García Tenesaca, Universidad de Especialidades Espíritu Santo de Guayaquil

Luis García Tenesaca es ingeniero en Telecomunicaciones de la UEES. Se desempeña como Account Manager de Huawei Technologies CO., LTD. Sus líneas de investigación son: protocolos y estándares de comunicación.

Antonio Cevallos Gamboa, Universidad de Especialidades Espíritu Santo de Guayaquil

Antonio Cevallos Gamboa es ingeniero en sistemas, magíster en Sistemas de Información Gerencial y Administración de Empresas, PhD candidate de la Universidad Del Rosario en Bogotá, Colombia. Es decano de la Facultad de Ingeniería en Sistemas Telecomunicaciones y Electrónica (FISTE). Enseña escritura académica, metodología de la investigación y sistemas de información en la Facultad de Postgrado en UEES. Sus líneas de investigación son: sistemas de información, Tics, innovación y liderazgo tecnológico.

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